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ABSTRACT  
 This paper considers a simple model of self-fulfilling expectations that leads to a multiple 
equilibrium of gender gaps in wages and participation rates. Rather than resorting to moral 
hazard problems related to unobservable effort, like in most of the related literature, our 
model fully relies on statistical discrimination. If firms believe that women will quit their jobs 
more often than equally productive men when shocks affecting household chores take place, 
our model predicts that this belief will increase the wage gap in favour of men which, in turn, 
will increase the female share of housework and exacerbate lower female participation in the 
labour market. Hence, both effects lead to a gendered equilibrium with large gaps, even 
though an ungendered equilibrium with no gaps is feasible. We examine the effects of 
gender-based and gender-neutral subsidies and find that the latter are more effective in 
removing the gendered equilibrium. Empirical analysis based on a time use survey for Spain 
is provided to test most of the implications of the model.  
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1. Introduction 
 
There is a growing literature that studies the joint determination of gender differentials 
in earnings and in the household division of labour.1  Most of these studies depart from 
Becker’s (1991) observation that a small initial comparative advantage of women in 
household production (e.g., in bearing and nurturing children) can lead to full 
specialization if, due to learning-by-doing and to household work increasing the 
marginal disutility of market work, the comparative advantage can grow over time.  
However, as it has been pointed out (see, e.g., Albanesi and Olivetti, 2007), huge 
improvements in medical and household technologies (plus less need of physical 
strength in most jobs) have rendered this comparative advantage unimportant and yet 
gender differences in the division of labour persist (see Bassanini and Saint Martin, 
2008 for a recent review).    
To tackle this puzzle, several explanations have been proposed without relying 
on the existence of active discrimination. They rely instead upon incentive problems in 
the labour market leading to self-fulfilling prophecies even when comparative 
advantages are absent. The idea is that the expectation by firms that women spend more 
time than men undertaking home tasks leads to earnings differentials in favour of men. 
Hence, since the expected opportunity cost is lower for women, they devote more time 
to household work, validating in this way firms’ beliefs. For example, Albanesi and 
Olivetti (2006) propose a model that generates this feature where firms are subject to 
incentive compatible constraints stemming from  lack of observability of both effort (a 
moral hazard problem) and home hours which, as in Becker (1991), affect the marginal 
utility of effort (an adverse selection problem). Lommerud and Vagstad (2007) follow 
Lazear and Rosen’s (1990) model of job ladders in assuming that there are two types of 
jobs: fast track and slow track jobs. Workers are placed in the fast track jobs if the firm 
pays a fixed investment. Since effort is not observable, firms will only place workers in 
the fast track jobs if their expected output is large enough to recoup the investment cost. 
If women have been traditionally the ones exerting primary major responsibility at 
home and wages are non-contractible, in equilibrium they will predominantly follow a 
“mommy track”. They analyze the stability properties of symmetric and asymmetric 
equilibria and characterize the situations where anti-discrimination policies (e.g., 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Francois (1998), Engineer and Welling (1999), Albanesi and Olivetti (2006, 2007), 
Lommerud and Vagstad (2007), and the references therein. 
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affirmative action) are effective depending on both the initial equilibrium and the 
(permanent or transitory) nature of these policies. 
Our paper falls into this stream of the literature and makes two contributions. 
First, we propose a simple model which yields self-fulfilling prophecies without using a 
moral hazard problem originated by the difficulty of perfectly monitoring effort or by 
the substitutability of effort at home and in the market, as the previous papers do. While 
moral hazard motivations are plausible, they are also somewhat restrictive. For example, 
wage gaps should be negligible for routine tasks by low-skilled employees for whom 
effort and output should be easily observable but, nevertheless, we still observe 
substantial gaps in those categories (see, e.g., de la Rica el al. 2008). Likewise, one 
could also think that household work, akin to running a “small firm”, leads to better 
organization skills therefore increasing female labour productivity instead of reducing 
it.  
Instead of stressing incentive problems, we let statistical discrimination play the 
key role.2 Specifically, statistical discrimination arises from different expectations  
about the distributions of disutility shocks (unexpected need of irregular hours at work 
or events that require parental leave, etc.) affecting equally productive men and women 
once they have been trained for a job. If future wages are predetermined with respect to 
these shocks, then job quit rate will differ across genders, inducing differences in labour 
market participation to depend on expected wage gaps, an issue that is not tackled by 
models relying on the moral hazard problem. Thus, in this fashion we are able to 
generate predictions about the relation between gender participation and wage gaps 
broadly in line with the available empirical evidence (see below). Further, the structure 
of our model is much simpler than in the above-mentioned literature since we do not 
need to analyse the design of incentive- compatible contracts in order to generate 
similar predictions. Secondly, in contrast to most existing work (see, e.g., the discussion 
in Lommenrud and Vagstad, 2007), our framework implies that, when multiple 
equilibria exist, welfare may be higher in the symmetric than in the asymmetric 
equilibrium. The reason why welfare tends to be greater with discrimination is that it 
promotes some form of “efficient specialization” in the labour market, an effect which 
is also present in our model. However, we also allow for a direct disutility of housework 
which is minimized –i.e. efficiency maximized- when there is equal split of housework. 
                                                 
2 See Altonji and Black (1999) and Donohue (2005) for recent surveys of the literature on “statistical 
discrimination”. 
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Under some scenarios, the second effect will dominate, implying that welfare is higher 
in the symmetric equilibrium. 
In our framework, under some assumptions about the distribution of shocks and 
the degree of diminishing returns to training, there are two types of equilibria: (i) an 
ungendered one, where there are no participation and wage gaps and the division of 
household work is fully egalitarian, and (ii) a gendered equilibrium where both gaps are 
favourable to men, so that women specialize in household tasks. We examine the effect 
of alternative policies in an economy that is initially in a gendered equilibrium despite 
the fact that men do not enjoy any comparative advantage in productivity or bargaining. 
We find that family aid subsidies targeted at women not only do not move the economy 
to the ungendered equilibrium but also make the equilibrium allocation of housework 
and the distribution of wages more unequal. In contrast, when family aid is received by 
both men and women, the gendered equilibrium may disappear. 
A first look at cross-country evidence provides some preliminary support to our 
motivation. Figure 1 shows the relationship between the male-female employment rate 
gap (horizontal axis) and the raw hourly wage gap (vertical axis) for workers aged 15-
64 with an educational attainment of upper secondary education or less in several 
OECD countries. The data correspond to 2001, the latest year for which comparable 
data on a large number of OECD countries is available (see Bassanini and Saint Martin, 
2008). The choice of lower-educated workers is due to the fact that higher educated 
women are less prone to quit their jobs when faced with a household shock because of 
their larger investment in human capital and the affordability of formal household/child-
care arrangements (see Altonji and Blank, 1999, and de la Rica et al., 2008).3 The figure 
shows a slight positive correlation (0.22) between both variables, which remains 
positive (0.16) once the two clear outliers of Korea and Italy are omitted.4 That is, 
without controlling for observable characteristics, higher labour market participation 
gaps are associated with higher wage gaps, as our model predicts. Regarding training by 
gender, Arulampanam et al. (2004) report evidence for Europe finding that although, on 
                                                 
3 Similar graphs for the overall population of workers aged between 15 and 54, working at least 15 hours 
per week, can be found in Bassanini and Saint Martin (2008). The correlation coefficient is -0.13.   
4  The low wage gender gap in Italy has been analyzed by Olivetti and Petrongolo (2006) where it is 
claimed that, in countries with low female participation, women with relatively low return to paid job 
would choose to stay out of the market, thus narrowing the wage gap. However, why the gap is much 
lower in Italy than in other low female participation countries, like Greece or Spain, remains a puzzle. 
The high wage gap in Korea is probably due to the prevalence of low-paid jobs in the high-growth East-
Asian economies. 
 5
average, women are no less likely than men to get training, there are significant 
differences in favour of men in the South-Mediterranean countries (see also the detailed 
discussion in de la Rica et al., 2008 for the Spanish case). 5 
 
                Figure 1: Relationship between wage and employment gaps 
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Figure 2: Relationship between family aid expenditure and employment gaps 
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5 Note, however, that, although training is the key channel which leads to wage differentials in our model, 
a similar interpretation could be obtained using the job-ladder allocation of workers analysed in Lazear 
and Rosen (1990) and even, albeit more loosely, in terms of the high concentration of women in college 
degrees with lower market returns (see Machin and Puhani, 2003) 
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Next, Figure 2 shows the relation between the participation gaps and the 
proportion of GDP devoted to family aid expenditure.6 The correlation is clearly 
negative implying that more generous family-aid policies give rise to lower 
participation gaps and, in view of Figure 1, to lower wage gaps. As it is well known, 
Northern European countries are the ones with lower gaps and higher family-aid 
expenditure shares whereas the South-Mediterranean ones are the ones with higher gaps 
and lower expenditure.         
         The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the model, first 
with homogeneous individuals and later allowing for gender differences. Section 3 
discusses the properties of the different equilibria. Section 4 deals with welfare analysis. 
Section 5 studies the effects of different policies to eliminate the asymmetric 
equilibrium. Section 6 provides some detailed empirical evidence on some of the 
predictions of the model using micro data from a survey on time use by members of 
Spanish households. Finally, section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Modelling gender gaps 
2.1 The basic setup: A training model  
 To account for the presence of both gender participation and wage gaps, we use a 
simple model inspired by Acemoglu and Pischke (1998)’s analysis of the financing of 
training in frictional labour markets, adapted to our framework where there are no 
search frictions but  exogenous disutility shocks are allowed to induce quits.7 
The basic setup is as follows. Men and women live for two periods and are 
endowed with identical time in each period and ability. They are both normalized to 1. 
The overall population is also normalized to 1 and each gender represents half of it. In 
period 1, firms are randomly matched with just one worker of either gender who is 
single. All individuals receive an amount of (specific) training τ offered by the firm, 
which may differ across genders. For simplicity, workers do not receive a wage during 
the first period. Finally, there is free entry of firms in this period, which bear a linear 
training cost, ττ =)(c . 
At the start of period 2, individuals of each gender form couples (exogenously) 
and decide on how to split the household chores on the basis of expected relative wages. 
                                                 
6 It includes cash tranfers, services and tax breaks towards family; see www.oecd.org/els/social/family 
/database. 
7 See also de la Rica et al. (2008). 
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Once this decision is taken, workers (ready to start producing after being trained) are 
made a wage offer, W , by the firm. After the wage has been announced, individuals 
suffer a disutility shock, ω , related to household tasks, which may force them to quit 
the job. The ω  shock is an i.i.d. random variable with c.d.f. )(ωF . The support of the 
distribution function may differ between men and women, and will depend on the way 
in which household chores are split. Individuals then decide whether to work or to quit. 
In the first case, production takes place and wages are subsequently paid. Output 
depends on the level of training received in period 1 with a production technology given 
by )(τa , where 2/)( αβττ =a , 10 <<α , so that 0(.)´ >a  and 0(.)´´ <a .  
Since workers’ productivity depends on the amount of received training,  firms 
will decide this amount in period 1 and the corresponding wage in period 2, taking as 
given the decision about the division of homework by couples, and hence the 
distribution of the shock for each gender. Conversely, couples bargain over the division 
of housework at the start of period 2 before the disutility shock is realized, taking as 
given the wages offered by firms to each gender. Accordingly, workers will always get 
trained in period 1 and will produce in period 2 as long as 0≥−ωW . 
      Summing up, the timing of decisions can be graphically represented as follows: 
                              t=1                       t=2 
                   |------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|  
                            ↑              ↑                            ↑                    ↑                    ↑       
                        Training     Household decision      Wage offer         Disutility shock       Production                                                           
                                    
2.2 Homogenous workers 
To solve for both wages and the amount of training, we proceed backwards in time. In 
order to simplify the derivations, we will assume that the distribution of shocks is 
uniform, i.e., ],0[ εω U∼  with 1≤ε , since the shock can never exceed the unit of time 
each individual has in period 2. To understand the choice of wages and training by 
firms, we start with a situation in which all workers are identical. We refer to this the 
setup as the one with homogenous workers. Later, gender differences will be considered 
in the analysis.   
 Under the assumption that the wage in period 2 is announced by the firm before 
the shock ω  is realized, firms will choose W  in order to maximize expected gross 
profit in this period, denoted by Π , leading to the following optimization problem:  
 8
                            .)(max1])([maxmax
2
0 ε
τωετ
WWadWa
W
W
WW
−=−=Π ∫                   (1)                           
Hence, the first-order condition (henceforth, f.o.c.) with respect to W  implies that the 
wage paid in equilibrium, *W , satisfies: 8 
                                                      ,
2
)()(* ττ aW =                                                           (2)  
so that expected gross profits in period 2  are: 
   =−=Π ετττ
*
]2/)()([)( Waa ,
4
)( 2
ε
τa                                           (3)  
where the term ε/*W  captures the probability of not quitting, i.e., that 0≥−ωW , and 
hence that the individual participates in the labour market.  
 Free-entry of firms implies that expected profits at the beginning of period 1 are 
driven down to zero. The zero-profit condition then pins down the optimal level of 
training in period 1, ∗τ , that is:  
0)( ** =−Π ττ .                                                      (4)  
Given the functional form of τ(a ),  ∗τ  is chosen to be:  
                                                .
4
1
1
2 α
ε
βτ
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=∗                                                                (5) 
Next, replacing (5) in (2) yields the optimal wage:  
                                               .
42
)1(22 α
α
ε
ββ −
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=∗W                                                         (6)                              
These expressions imply that, when the support of the shock is larger (i.e., ε  is higher), 
the worker gets less training and a lower wage. The intuition is that a greater expected 
shock implies a higher probability of quitting in period 2 and hence, since this reduces 
expected profits, firms respond by lowering the amount of training. Note that our 
assumption that 1<α  plays a crucial role. If  1≥α  - that is, if there were weak 
diminishing returns in training - then the firm would respond to a higher probability of 
quitting by increasing the amount of training, using the resulting wage rise to offset the 
higher expected value of the shock.  We assume that diminishing returns in training are 
                                                 
8 This is just the average of the worker’s productivity and the outside wage, which is assumed to be zero.  
The weight ½ in the wage is due to the choice of the uniform distribution in the illustration. Alternative 
distributions will give rise to a weighted average with unequal weights.   
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sufficiently strong to prevent this counterintuitive result.  
 From equation (5) we can compute the probability that an individual works, 
which corresponds to the participation rate since the population equals unity. This 
probability is given by εω /  )(Pr ** ∗=≤= WWP , while the expected wage is 
ε/2* ∗∗ =WWP . Using (5), we have: 
                              ,1
2
)1(2
2
1
1
α
α
α
ε
β −−−∗ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=P                             (7) 
                             ,
4
1
1
2 α
ε
β −∗∗ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=WP                                                          (8) 
which, under the assumption that 1<α , implies that a greater value of ε  results in a 
lower probability of employment/participation rate and a lower expected wage. We 
further suppose: 
Assumption 1:  The following inequality holds: ( ) εεβ α ≤−1 12 4/ . 
Assumption 1 ensures that 1≤∗P .  The assumption simply requires the productivity of 
training, β , not to be too large since, otherwise, the resulting wage would be 
sufficiently high, relative to the shock, to lead to full participation. In what follows, we 
will denote αεβ −1
1
2 )4/(  by the parameter 1b  which, by Assumption 1 and 1≤ε ,  
satisfies 11 ≤b . Furthermore, we can express the equilibrium wage as 1* bW ε= , 
implying that 1* ≤W . 
                                                        
2.3 Allowing for different distributions of shocks 
Once the basic expressions for training and the wage have been derived for homogenous 
workers, we introduce gender differences by allowing for different distributions of 
disutility shocks for men and women. Although at this stage we take this differential 
feature to be exogenous, it will be endogenised later on when we model the decision 
process within the household. The key difference across genders is that the c.d.f. for 
men, )(ωmF , is assumed to be stochastically dominated by the c.d.f. for women, 
),(ωfF  namely, )()( ωω fm FF ≥  for 0>ω . As earlier, we assume that the 
corresponding distributions are uniform, so that  ],0[ ii U εω ∼  (i=m, f)  with mf εε ≥ . 
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 From (5) and (6), the optimal amount of training received by men and women 
and their corresponding wages are given by: 
                                        ,
4
1
1
2 α
ε
βτ
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
i
i .,     ,)(2
2 mfiW ii ==
α
τβ                            (9)                        
Clearly, if fm εε < , then mf ττ <  and mf WW < . That is, since women have a higher  
probability of quitting, they receive less training and therefore a lower wage than men. 
 As before, we can also derive the corresponding participation rates in the labour 
market which are given by iP  = Pr ( )ii W≤ω , yielding:  
                                       ,/ mmm WP ε= ./ fff WP ε=                                                   (10) 
Thus, it follows that mf PP < . To ensure that participation rates are bounded above by 
unity, we modify Assumption 1 accordingly to:  
Assumption 2:  The following inequality holds: ( ) ii εεβ α ≤−1 12 4/  for fmi ,= . 
 
2.4 Gender gaps 
From (9) and (10), it is straightforward to compute the gender participation and wage 
gaps, denoted by p and w, respectively, which are defined as the ratio of the relevant 
variables for men and for women. That is, p = fm PP /  and =w  fm WW / , yielding:  
    ,
)1(2
2
α
α
ε
ε −−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
m
fp
)1(2 α
α
ε
ε −
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
m
fw                                         (11)                            
   
Since 10 << α , then the following proposition holds: 
 
 Proposition 1:  Gender gaps depend on the difference in the distribution of the shock. 
Whenever fm εε < , it is verified that p >1 and w >1.  For fm εε = , then p = w =1. 
 
 The intuition for this result is again simple. If fm εε < ,  then women will have a 
higher probability of quitting in period 2 than men. Hence, they are offered less training 
in period 1 and a lower wage in period 2. Their lower wage is obviously the result of 
lower training, while their lower participation is a combination of a direct effect due to 
the actual distribution of the shock and of an indirect effect as statistical discrimination 
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leads to a lower wage. Identical distributions of the shock, on the other hand, would 
imply no statistical discrimination and hence the absence of gaps. 
 
3. Household division of labour and equilibria 
3.1 Household division of labour 
The next step is to endogenise the couple’s decision of how to split household chores at 
the beginning of period 2. We assume that there is a household good to be produced by 
the members of the household, and that this good provides a fixed utility level, u . The 
couple jointly decides how to split the responsibility for production of this good by 
choosing the fraction ]1,0[∈s  of the household chores allocated to the woman. 
The production of the good has two disutility costs. Part of the cost is known ex 
ante, while another part is random and depends on the shock received by the household 
in period 2. To give an example, suppose that the household good consists of raising 
children. Children have to be collected from school and ferried to their after-school 
activities every day, imposing a (known) disutility cost to the member of the couple 
doing it. Then, there are shocks, such as a child being sick and needing to stay home 
with a parent, which are uncertain. These shocks, however, have an opportunity cost 
only if the parent is working since they imply a reduction in the (monetary) utility 
derived from the job.  
The certain disutility costs of producing the household good for the man and 
woman are assumed to be )1( 1 −−s and )1)1(( 1 −− −s , respectively, which are increasing 
and convex. Thus, if 1=s , the man gets no disutility, and vice versa. As before, there is 
a single shock affecting the household, ,ω  whose distribution is ].,0[ εU  Since a 
fraction s of this shock is borne by the woman and (1-s) by the man, this implies  
εε sf =  and εε )1( sm −= . Further assumptions are that there is full income sharing 
within the household and that the partners maximize the sum of utilities with respect to 
s  taking their wages as given.  
Thus, expected household utility accruing to the household, net of the cost of the 
shock, denoted by HV , is given by: 
         ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−+−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+−−+= ∫∫ − 21 111)(1))1((
/
0
)1/(
0 ss
dsWdsWuV
sW
f
sW
m
H fm ωεωωεω , 
   which can be expressed as: 
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   .2
1
11
)1(2
1 22
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−+−⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ +−+= sss
W
s
WuV fmH ε                      (12) 
The household members jointly maximize household utility as in the collective decision 
making models of, e.g., Chiappori (1988, 1997). There are two elements that the 
household takes into account when choosing s. On the one hand, there are the convex 
costs of housework - captured by the last bracketed term in (12) - which have an 
equalizing effect as total disutility is minimized when housework is equally split. On the 
other, there is a participation effect. To understand this last effect, note that expected 
household income - the first bracketed term in (12)- is maximized when the member of 
the couple with the lower wage bears all the shock, the reason being that this ensures 
labour market participation of at least one of the household members. The choice of s is 
then driven by this trade-off: specialization in market and household production by the 
two household members maximizes income, but full sharing of housework minimizes 
the disutility associated with producing the household good.  
The, maximizing (12) with respect to s  yields the f. o. c.: 
                                    ,0
)1(
11
)1(2
1
222
2
2
2
=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−−+⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−=∂
∂
sss
W
s
W
s
V fmH
ε                   (13) 
 such that the equilibrium allocation of household work, denoted by *s  , satisfies: 
                                            .
2
1
2
11
2
2
2
*
*
ε
ε
f
m
W
W
s
s
−
−
=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −                                                          (14) 
Under the assumption that participation rates are less than 1, i.e. 1/ ≤= iii WP ε  for 
fmi ,= , the term ε2/2iW  is also less than 1.9 Then 0/* <fdWds  and 0/* >mdWds , 
implying that a higher female (male) wage results in a reduction (increase) in the share 
of household work allocated to women. Moreover, when wages are equalised, i.e., 
mf WW = , then the allocation is even among genders,  with 5.01 ** =−= ss . Note that 
this is due to the symmetry assumption in the way in which we model the costs of 
housework (no comparative advantage of either gender), together with the fact that the 
convex cost function implies that the total disutility cost is minimized when chores are 
evenly split. 
                                                 
9 The fact that 12/2 ≤εiW  also ensures that the second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied. 
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3.2 Multiple equilibria 
Firms’ and households’ decisions are given by equations (9) and (14). In equilibrium 
expectations are fulfilled, and hence the equilibrium is determined by the solution of the 
following system of equations: 
                                               ,)1(21 α
αε −−⋅= sbWf      (E.1) 
      ,)1( )1(21 α
αε −−−⋅= sbWm     (E.2) 
,
2
1
2
11
2
2
2
*
*
ε
ε
f
m
W
W
s
s
−
−
=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −      (E.3) 
which jointly determine the division of housework across household members and their 
respective wages. To analyse the equilibrium configurations, substitute (E.1) and (E.2)   
into (E.3) so that the f.o.c. (14) becomes: 
                                           ,
)(1
)1(11
1*
2
1*
2
2
*
*
α
α
α
α
−−
−−
−
−−=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
sb
sb
s
s                                            (15) 
  with 2/12 bb ≡ , such that 12 ≤b .10  
 To examine the solutions of equation (15) it is useful to define the following 
functions of s :  
                                    
,
1
)1(1)(
 ,1)(
1
2
1
2
2
α
α
α
α
−
−
−
−
−
−−≡
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −≡
sb
sbsg
s
ssf
 
 whose intersection results in the equilibrium allocation of housework. On the one hand, 
)(sf  is decreasing and convex with a vertical asymptote at s =0, with 0)1( =f  and 
;1)5.0( =f  moreover, from (11), it can be seen that )(sf is inversely related to the 
gender wage gap. On the other hand, )(sg  has two vertical asymptotes at ,
1
2 α
α−= bs and 
;1=s  further, ,0)0( =g ,1)5.0( =g 0)1( 12 =−
−
α
α
bg , and it is increasing in the range 
),0[
1
2 α
α−∈ bs  and decreasing when )1,( 12 α
α−∈ bs  . Lastly, under Assumption 2, it can be 
                                                 
10 Given Assumption 1, it follows that .5.02 ≤b  
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checked tat it has an inflection point in the interval )1,(
1
2
1
2 α
α
α
α −− −∈ bbs .  
Figure 3 depicts the intersections of )(sf  and )(sg . There are three values of s  
that satisfy equation (15). In one of them, ,5.0*1 =s  while in the other two solutions we 
have )1,5.0(
1
2
*
2 α
α−−∈ bs and ),0( 12*3 α
α−∈ bs . Note that corner solutions are ruled out 
because our assumption about the functional form of the cost function implies that, if 
one member of the couple does all household work, her/ his marginal disutility becomes 
infinite and hence such a solution is never optimal. 
 
                      Figure 3: Gendered and ungendered equilibria 
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Because we have assumed symmetry across genders in all respects, we have two 
possible asymmetric equilibria: one in which women bear a greater share of housework 
and get a lower wage (point G), and another in which men do more than half of the 
household chores and receive a lower wage (point G´). In the sequel, we focus on the 
more realistic case where women carry out a disproportionate share of household 
chores, and hence ignore that part of the domain of the )(sg  function defined by 
),0[
1
2 α
α−
b  so that the permitted range is Sbs ≡∈ − )1( ,12 α
α
. In other words, we restrict the 
analysis to two possible equilibria, labelled respectively as the gendered equilibrium 
(denoted by G), where 5.0* >Gs , and the ungendered equilibrium (U) where 5.0* =Us . 
Thus, by replacing εε *sf =  and εε )1( *sm −=  in (11), the following result holds:  
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 Proposition 2: Under Assumption 2 and Ss∈ , there are two equilibrium solutions for 
the female share of household work: (i) an ungendered solution with 5.0* =Us , 1* =Uw  
and 1* =Up  and (ii) a gendered solution with *Gs ),1,5.0( /)1(2 αα−−∈ b  1* >Gw and 1* >Gp . 
 
To illustrate these equilibria, consider the following numerical example. Using 
the values of the parameters: 5.0=α , 1=ε  and 4/32=β , which satisfy Assumption 2, 
the roots of  equation (15) are: 7236.0* =Gs  and 5.0* =Us . In the G-solution, the wage 
and participation gaps are 62.1=∗Gw  and .22.4=∗Gp  In spite of yielding rather 
extreme gaps, this example illustrates that the asymmetries can be very large in the G-
equilibrium. Indeed, (raw) wage gaps of 62 per cent can be found in those countries 
with the largest gender wage differences; see Blau and Kahn (2000). 
 
3.3 Comparative statics  
Inspection of (15) and Figure 3 indicates that the system in (E.1)-(E.3) may have only 
one equilibrium. In effect, consider a higher value of β  which increases 2b . Then as the 
range ( )αααα /)1(2/)1(2 1 , −− −∈ bbs  gets narrower, the g(s) function becomes steeper, moving 
the G-equilibrium to the left. That is, as 2b  increases, the G- equilibrium exhibits a less 
unequal division of housework and hence lower wage and participation gaps. Indeed, as 
shown in Figure 4, for sufficiently high values of β , there could be a unique U-
equilibrium. Hence: 
 
Proposition 3: Under Assumption 2 and Ss∈ ,  
(i) The higher the value of β ,  the less unequal the division of household labour 
is in the gendered equilibrium (i.e. the lower *Gs  is) and hence the lower the 
wage and participation gaps are. 
(ii) Economies with a sufficiently high value of β  will exhibit a unique 
ungendered equilibrium. 
 
The intuition for Proposition 3 is as follows. Recall that the household faces a 
trade-off between expected income and housework disutility: the former effect implies 
that full specialization is optimal (s=1), while the latter tends to induce an even 
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allocation of housework across genders (s=1/2). When wages are low ( β  is small), the 
household is less willing to forgo expected income in order to reduce the disutility cost. 
Hence, if firms offer equal wages there will be an even division of household chores 
but, if they offer different wages, housework will be unevenly allocated. By contrast, 
when wages are high (β  is large), the household is more willing to forgo expected 
income in order to reduce the disutility cost, leading to a lower *Gs . If wages are 
sufficiently high, the disutility effect dominates, making the household division of work 
(almost) even when wages are different across genders.11 But if s is (close to) 0.5, then 
firms will pay similar wages to men and women. Hence the G-equilibrium cannot exist. 
               
Figure 4: The effect of productivity on equilibria 
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 To the extent that a higher value of β  corresponds to more productive 
economies, Proposition 3 implies that the gender gaps will be lower in these economies. 
This result on its own would explain the lower wage and participation gaps in the 
Nordic (richer) countries than in the Southern countries reported in Figure 1, either 
because their gendered equilibrium is less unequal or because it does not exist.  
 
4. Welfare analysis 
In order to analyze the welfare implications of the above-mentioned equilibria, let us 
consider the problem faced by a social planner who chooses the allocation of housework 
                                                 
11 To see this simply let ∞→2b  in equation (15), which makes its RHS equal to 1, implying that s=0.5.   
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taking into account its effect on wages. Since firms make zero expected profits due to 
the free-entry assumption, aggregate welfare is simply equal to the welfare of the 
representative household. Thus, substituting (9) into (12), the welfare function becomes:  
                        ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−+−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−+= −−−− 2
1
11)1()( 1
1
2
1
1
2 ss
sbsbusV S αα .                        (16) 
We can now examine which of the two equilibria results in a higher level of 
welfare by substituting the f. o. c. (15) of the household into this expression, yielding: 
2*
1
1
*
2*
)(
12)(
s
sbusV S
α−−−−−= .         (17) 
Differentiating (17) yields: 
          ,)(
1
221)( 1*23**
*
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
−−= −− α
α
α
α sb
sds
sdV S  
which may be positive or negative, implying that it is ambiguous whether welfare is 
higher in the G- or in the U-equilibrium. The reason for this ambiguity is again the 
trade-off between maximizing market income, which occurs when there is full 
specialisation, and minimizing the disutility from household work, which requires equal 
sharing of housework.  
Once more, the level of productivityβ  is the key parameter determining which 
effect dominates. Recall that 2b  is increasing in β , while *Gs  decreases with the 
productivity level. Hence, >** /)( dssdV S 0 for sufficiently high values ofβ ,  leading to  
higher welfare in the G-equilibrium. To illustrate this result consider again our previous 
numerical example where 5.0=α , 1=ε , 4/32=β , leading to the two equilibria  
7236.0* =Gs  and 5.0* =Us . If we further assume that u=10, and substitute these values 
in (17) we obtain that the level of welfare in the G- equilibrium, 2.3)( * =GS sV , is lower 
than that obtained in the U-equilibrium, 1.4)( * =US sV . Lower values of β  would yield 
the opposite result. 
 This finding contrasts with the results in existing work on this type of multiple 
equilibria, where it has generally been found that specialization results in higher 
welfare.12 The difference lies in the symmetric way we have modelled the disutility cost 
                                                 
12 An exception is the model model proposed by Lang at al. (2005) about racial discrimination in labour 
markets due to posted wage offers, where it is shown that discrimination creates economic inefficiency. 
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associated with housework. Moreover, our analysis has the implication that the nature of 
the efficient equilibrium may change. Suppose that the productivity parameter grows 
exogenously over time. Initially, when β  is low,  specialization delivers higher welfare. 
But as productivity grows, the opportunity cost of sharing housework falls and the U-
equilibrium becomes the more efficient one.13  
 
5. Policies: Family aid and affirmative action 
In this section we discuss which type of policies could shift the economy from the G- 
equilibrium to the U-equilibrium. Following an extensive literature on this issue, we 
examine two specific gender policies: (i) subsidised family aid, and (ii) affirmative 
action. 
 
 5.1 Subsidised family aid 
5.1.1 Gender-based vs. Gender-neutral family aid 
Consider the introduction of government-funded family aid. To start with, suppose that 
only working women receive the subsidy, and that this subsidy is proportional to their 
wage in period 2 so that, if working, they will receive an income equal to fW )1( κ+ , 
where 10 <<κ . Hence, women remain at work in period 2 if fW .0)1( ≥−+ ωκ  Men 
do not receive the subsidy and therefore work if mW .0≥−ω  For the time being, we 
will ignore the financing of the subsidy to concentrate on the partial equilibrium effect. 
At the end of the section this issue will be dealt with. 
 Following the same reasoning as in section 2.2 about firms’ behaviour, but this 
time with the upper limit of the integral for women in (1) changed from fW  to 
)1( κ+fW , we have that firms choose the following amount of training and wages: 
  ,)(
2
    ,
4
)1( 2/2
1
1
ακκκ τβε
βκτ
α
∗∗∗ =⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +=
−
ff
f
f W      (18) 
where the superscript κ  denotes the case with subsidies. Male workers are offered the 
training level and wage derived in (9). Note that the total income of women in period 2, 
                                                                                                                                               
However, their setup is quite different from our model since they assume that the posted wage offers are 
binding on the employers.  
13 For analyses of how exogenous changes in productivity affect gender differences in the labour market, 
see Olivetti (2006) and Albanesi and Olivetti (2007). 
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,∗κfY  is now given by: 
   2/)(
2
)1()1( ακκκ τκβκ ∗∗∗ +=+= fff WY .     (19) 
Clearly, ∗∗ > ff ττ κ  and ∗∗ > ff WW κ . For mmf εεεκ /)( −< , i.e. if the subsidy is not 
too large, it is also the case that women receive less training and lower wages than men, 
that is, ∗∗ < mf ττ κ   and  ∗∗ < mf WW κ .14 Thus, not surprisingly, women fare better in the 
labour market when they are subsidised to stay in the job. They may even get higher 
wages than men if the subsidy is sufficiently high, a possibility that we ignore in the 
sequel. Likewise, from (18) and (19), a straightforward result would be that, abstracting 
from the household decision, the corresponding participation and wage gaps with family 
benefits, κp  and κw , are lower than without subsidies. This result, however, will not 
hold once we take into account the endogeneity of the division of housework.  
Consider the household’s decision in this case. Each household chooses s to 
maximize the expected net utility which is now given by: 
                                 ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−+−⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ +−+−= sss
Y
s
WuV fmH
1
11
)1(2
12
22 κ
κ
ε .                         (20) 
The resulting f. o. c., once we have substituted for wages, yields the new equilibrium 
relationship: 
                                 ,
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s                                                    (21) 
where .)1( 21
2
23 bbb >+= −
−
α
α
κ  The LHS of equation (21) is the same as in (15), while the 
RHS tilts upwards and takes a value greater than 1 when s=0.5. The new equilibrium is 
depicted in Figure 5 and can be summarised as follows:  
 
Proposition 4: Under Assumption 2 and Ss∈  , a wage subsidy to female workers 
leads to a gendered equilibrium with ).1,5.0(* ∈κs  The equilibrium division of 
household work implies a higher share for women, and hence a greater wage and 
participation gap than in the absence of the subsidy. 
 
                                                 
14 In equilibrium, since ε=ε sf  and ε−=ε )1( sm , this condition becomes 12 −<κ s . 
 20
                        Figure 5: The effect of a subsidy to women 
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A surprising feature of (21) is that, with the subsidy in place, the U-equilibrium 
with 5.0=s  does not exist any longer. In other words, a gender-based subsidy policy 
only yields the G-equilibrium since the asymmetry in income due to the subsidy 
prevents a symmetric equilibrium. In effect, suppose that households set s=0.5. Then 
women have a greater probability of staying in the job than men (the combination of the 
same shock plus the subsidy), implying that firms will offer women more training and a 
higher wage. But if female wages are higher than men’s, then s=0.5 cannot be a solution 
to the household’s problem. Hence, the U- equilibrium disappears.  Moreover, from 
Figure 5 we can see that the new G- equilibrium lies to the right of the initial one, 
implying a higher equilibrium value of s. For example, in our previous example, 
with 1.0=κ , we get =*κs 0.7299 > =*Gs 0.7236. To understand this result, recall the 
trade-off faced by the household between increasing expected income and reducing the 
disutility of housework. Because of the increase in the probability of female 
participation due to the subsidy, the household can now afford to raise the probability of 
male participation by reducing their housework share. This result shares the spirit of the 
analysis of affirmative action policies in Coate and Loury (1993) where it is argued that 
an exogenous increase in the hiring probability faced by a minority would reduce their 
educational effort and hence increase the educational gap. Similarly, in our framework 
the exogenous increase in the probability of participation of women reduces their 
commitment to the labour market.  
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Consider now the alternative policy of giving the same subsidy to men and 
women. Following the same reasoning as above, this would yield the equilibrium 
relationship:  
                                       ,
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 that will again narrow the range of values of s  for which the RHS of (22) is positive, 
since .23 bb >  The first implication is that the subsidy shifts the G-equilibrium to the 
left, reducing the value of *Gs . Moreover, if the subsidy is high enough (i.e. if 3b  is 
sufficiently large), equation (22) would have a unique U-equilibrium, as in Figure 4, 
with higher participation rates and wages of both genders than under laissez-faire, 
although the corresponding relative gaps remain the same as without subsidies. Once 
more this is the result of the trade-off between higher expected income due to 
specialization and lower disutility due to the sharing of housework. The subsidy 
effectively increases expected income and hence reduces the opportunity cost of sharing 
housework. If the increase in income is large enough, the household will simply 
minimize the disutility associated with housework and choose equal sharing of domestic 
tasks. This reasoning also echoes some of Saint-Paul (2007)´s recent arguments in 
against gender-based taxation. 
 
5.1.2 Financing the subsidy 
We next turn to the financing of the subsidy. It is clear from the earlier discussion that a 
subsidy for women financed by taxing men will lead to an asymmetry in the RHS of 
(21) eliminating therefore the U-equilibrium. Instead, we suppose that firms are taxed 
for their training expenditures at a proportional rate t in period 1.15 Under a balanced 
government budget, this implies that ( ) ( )mmffmf PWPWt +=+ κττ .                              
In this tax-subsidy scheme, denoted by the superscriptT , participation is given 
by i
T
i
T
i WP εκ /)1( ** += ,  and firms set the wage to be 2/)()(* iiTi aW ττ = , implying that 
their gross profits are   
),1(
4
)()(
2
κε
ττ +=Π
i
i
i
a      (23) 
                                                 
15 We have also examined the case where the tax is lump-sum in the first period. This case yields similar 
results though the calculations are somewhat more complex.   
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Whereas the zero-profit condition for firms is now given by  
0)1()( =+−Π ii t ττ .      (24) 
Noting that we can write iii WP=Π )(τ , this condition is simply equivalent to 
iii WPt =+ )1(τ , which can then be replaced into the budget constraint to obtain the 
equilibrium relation between the tax and the subsidy rates, i.e., )1/( κκ −=t .  The zero-
profit condition, together with the expression for t just obtained, yields the optimal level 
of training 
                                     
αα κε
βκ
ε
βτ −− ⎥⎦
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1
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.   (25) 
Equation (25) implies lower training and wages than without subsidies as a result of the 
labour tax paid by firms. Participation, given by i
T
i
T
i WP εκ /)1( ** += , may be higher or 
lower than under laissez-faire due to the opposite effects of the subsidy that tends to 
increase it and the lower wage that tends to reduce it. 
As regards the household decision on s , a similar argument as before yields the 
following f.o.c.:  
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 where )(24 κhbb ≡  with αα κκκ −+−≡ 1
1
)]1()1[()(h . Then, 1)0( =h  and 0)´( >κh  iff 
)1/()1( αακ +−< , that is, for not too high values of κ  , it holds that )(κh is increasing 
and therefore 24 bb > . Hence, this tax-subsidy scheme increases the slope of the )(sg  
function, implying that the equilibrium value of s  will fall and, potentially, become a 
unique U- equilibrium. Indeed, for the G-equilibrium to disappear we also need that 
there is a unique intersection, which will be the case if 5.01 /)1(4 ≤− − ααb , i.e. if 
./2)1)(1( 223 βεκκ αα −≥−+  Thus, the following result holds: 
 
Proposition 5: Under Assumption 2 and Ss∈ ,  if κ  is not too large, an equal wage 
subsidy to male and female workers financed with a proportional tax on training 
expenditures by firms in period 1 will reduce the degree of gender segregation and may 
lead to an ungendered equilibrium with .5.0* =Ts  
 
 23
The intuition for this result again relies on the two opposite effects affecting 
participation: a direct one from the subsidy which tends to increase participation, and an 
indirect one operating through the reduction of training induced by the tax paid by 
firms, which tends to reduce participation. The condition καα >+− )1/()1(  is easy to 
interpret since, from (26), a low value of α  implies a low elasticity of training with 
respect to the subsidy. This means that the wage does not fall by much and the direct 
effect dominates, leading to higher participation and higher expected income for any 
given division of housework. As in section 3.3, a higher income implies that couples 
can afford to reduce the disutility cost of housework thereby choosing an equal split.  
 
5.2. Affirmative action 
An alternative policy is to impose by law an affirmative action rule that prevents firms 
from engaging in statistical discrimination. In our setup this type of discrimination 
appears because firms offer different amounts of training to men and women. Consider 
then a policy that forces firms to post the amount of training they will provide before 
they are matched with a candidate. Recalling that all individuals get trained in period 1 
and that the population is equally split across genders, the expected profit of a firm is 
given by:  
   =Π )(τ .
4
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τ                                              (3’)  
Then, the zero-profit condition 0)( =−Π aa ττ  pins down the optimal level of training 
in period 1 under affirmative action, aτ , yielding:  
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Since now men and women receive the same amount of training, equation (2) implies 
that they also receive the same wage.   
 Turning to the couple’s division of household work, from the f.o.c. in (E.3), 
equal wages imply equal sharing of domestic tasks. Hence, the only possible 
equilibrium is 5.0=s . Note that this implies that it is optimal for the firm to offer the 
same amount of training to both genders. In other words, since the reason for the 
existence of the U- equilibrium is a coordination problem, affirmative action will 
coordinate firms and households on the U- equilibrium in which firms would choose not 
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to discriminate across genders even if they could. 
 That affirmative action policies reduce gender gaps is not surprising. A recurrent 
question in the literature is whether or not such policy needs to be permanent or whether 
a one-shot policy can permanently reduce gender gaps; see Coate and Loury (1993). 
The fact that, in our setup, multiplicity is due to a coordination problem implies that a 
one-period policy will change the equilibrium permanently. Imposing equal amounts of 
training for men and women changes the household decision problem and results in 
equal sharing of household tasks. Once firms observe s=0.5 and couples are paid equal 
wages, there is no reason for either of them to expect a different outcome even if the 
affirmative action policy were removed. Hence, the economy will remain in the U- 
equilibrium. 
 
5.3. Asymmetric economies  
Our framework makes the strong assumption of complete symmetry between men and 
women, and it is precisely this assumption that allows for the existence of U-equilibria. 
In this section we briefly examine how results get modified when we assume that there 
is an (exogenous) asymmetry associated to gender. 
 There are many ways of allowing for asymmetries, ranging from differences in 
comparative advantage in home/market production to the structure of intra-household 
bargaining. For simplicity, we focus on the latter and assume that men have higher 
bargaining power in the household decision-making process, measured by η , so that 
household utility can be expressed as:  
,2
1
11)1(
)1(
)1(
2
1 22
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−
−++−⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −+−
++=
sss
W
s
WuV fmH ηηηηε  
with )1,0(∈η . The resulting f. o. c. together with the expressions for wages in (9) imply 
that equilibrium is given by: 
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 where we denote the relative bargaining power )1/()1( ηη −+  by 1>ξ . The LHS of 
this expression is the same as in the symmetric case, while the RHS, i.e. the )(sg  
function, shifts upwards when compared to equation (15). As a result, when s =0.5, 
)(sg  takes a value greater than 1, implying that the U- equilibrium cannot exist. 
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Because the household gives greater weight to the disutility of the man, even when 
wages are the same across genders, women will end up doing more than half of the 
housework. But as women are bearing a greater fraction of the shock, firms will pay 
lower wages to them. Hence only the G-equilibrium exists.  
  Under this asymmetric case, a wage subsidy targeted to women can work. In 
effect, a subsidy equal to fWκ paid to participating women implies that equations (21) 
and (30) yield the following f. o. c.: 
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 where the superscript ),( ηκ  denotes the case with asymmetric power and subsidies, 
and α
α
κ −
−
+= 1
2
23 )1(bb . Thus, one could choose κ  so as to make the right-hand-side of 
(31) equal to 1 when s=0.5, yielding:  
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   implying that the f. o. c. in (28) becomes:  
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Comparison of (32) and (15), using the same reasoning as in (29), implies that the U-
equilibrium becomes more likely. Whether it is a unique equilibrium or not hinges on 
the sizes of ξ  and 2b , which in turn depend upon η  and β  (for given values of α  and 
ε ). This result somewhat mimics the argument made by Alesina et al. (2007) in their 
proposal of different taxation for men and women. In their reasoning, the asymmetry 
across genders is that women have higher elasticity of labour supply than men and, 
therefore, in line with to the Ramsey principle of optimal taxation, the former should 
have lower taxes than the latter. In our setup, the asymmetry arises from different 
bargaining power but the policy implication is similar. Notice, however, that (29) also 
implies the novel result that, for given η , this gender-based taxation scheme is bound to 
be more effective in achieving the U-equilibrium in more productive economies (those 
with higherβ ), than in less productive ones. 
 26
6. Empirical evidence 
6.1. Data and descriptive statistics 
The main data used for the empirical analysis is taken from the 2002-2003 Spanish 
Time Use Survey (STUS) where individual information is available to us. This dataset 
is part of the Harmonized European Time Use Survey (HETUS) carried out by Eurostat.  
       STUS contains a wide range of information about roughly 20,000 households 
(including household composition, region, domestic service, housing characteristics, 
household income, etc.) and on each of its members (demographic and labour market 
characteristics, including wages). The main novelty of this database is the availability of 
individual information on daily activities, through a personal diary, which all members 
of the household over ten years old must complete on a selected day. The diary records 
the activities undertaken by each respondent. For each 10 minutes interval (and during 
24 hours), individuals must record which are the primary and secondary activities that 
have been undertaken. Activities are coded according to a list provided by Eurostat (for 
details, see Table A1 in the Appendix).  Housework time is defined as the number of 
minutes reported in the diary that each individual devotes, as primary activity, to 
category 3 in Table A1, i.e. household and family (including cooking, cleaning, laundry, 
gardening and pets, maintenance and repairs, shopping, household management, 
childcare and other adults’ care). From this information, we can compute the shares in 
total housework of each partner and hence the ratio between women’s and men’s shares.  
Our sample is restricted to employed couples living in the same household, aged 
25-64 years, with valid information on wages and housework share. The resulting final 
sample consists of 1,578 households for which there is also full information on basic 
demographic and labour market characteristics of both the head and the spouse. Table 1 
presents descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) of wages, full-time/part-
time status, age, education, availability of family aid and domestic service, and female 
housework share by different demographic characteristics of the couple.16  
 
 
 
                                                 
16 Wages are measured on an hourly basis. However, the original wage variable is net monthly wages and 
it is reported in intervals of 500 euros. There are seven wage intervals: 0-500, 500-1000, 100-1500, 1500-
2000, 2000-2500, 2500-3000 and >3000. We have taken the average value of each interval as the point 
value for net monthly wages. Then, we converted net monthly wages into hourly wages by using weekly 
working hours, which are available for each member of the household.  
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Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics   
Working couples (20-64 years aged) – N=1,578 households 
Variables 
 
STUS (2002-2003) 
 Mean St. Deviation 
Wages   
Hourly Wage Woman  7.30 4.11 
Hourly  Wage Man 8.60 4.18 
Average Log Wage Gap (Man-Woman) 0.19 0.52 
Full-Time/Part-Time Status   
% Full Time Woman  0.849 0.35 
% Full Time Men 0.973 0.16 
Education   
% Primary (or less) Education Woman 0.37 0.48 
% Primary (or less) Education Man 0.40 0.49 
% Secondary Educ. Woman 0.31 0.46 
% Secondary Educ. Man 0.32 0.47 
% University Educ. Woman 0.32 0.46 
% University Educ. Man 0.26 0.44 
Age   
Average Age Woman 40.1 8.07 
Average Age Man 42.33 8.32 
Female Housework Share   
Average 0.65 0.18 
By Education   
Primary 0.67 0.19 
Secondary 0.66 0.18 
University 0.62 0.18 
By Age   
< 30 0.64 0.21 
31-40 0.64 0.17 
41-50 0.66 0.18 
> 50  0.68 0.17 
Other Household variables   
% Receiving family aid income 0.03 0.18 
% Domestic service 0.22 0.41 
Number of children 0.65 0.86 
Source: Spanish Time Use Survey Data (2002-2003).  
 
Inspection of Table 1 shows that men earn 19% on average more than their 
partners. Also, 97% of males in our sample work on full-time basis while around 15% 
of women work as part-timers. Regarding education, the percentage of college 
education is higher for women (32% compared to 26%), indicating that working wives 
are on average more educated than their spouses. In addition, they are on average two 
years younger. Finally, the burden of housework is vastly taken by the female partner: 
on average, the female housework share is 65%. Further, it is higher the lower the 
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female educational level is, but even for women with college education it averages 62%. 
Regarding age, younger women seem to share the housework with their partners more 
equally than older ones. Finally, 22% of the households have some form of domestic 
service but only 3% receive family aid. 
 
6.2. Female share of household work and the gender wage gap 
Proposition 2 above implies that, under the G-equilibrium, the female share of 
housework is larger than 0.5 and the wage gap favours men. In addition, the higher the 
gender wage gap, the higher the female housework share will be in equilibrium. Thus,  
we should observe a positive correlation between the female share and the gender wage 
gap within couples. This is the first empirical implication to be tested with our dataset.  
We present two types of evidence to check whether Proposition 2 holds. The 
first one is just the correlation between aggregate gender wage gaps and aggregate 
female housework share across countries. The HETUS website allows users to get 
aggregate information for participating countries on the average time spent by men and 
women in housework tasks for specific demographic groups. Like in Figure 1, we have 
selected married and working men and women with less than tertiary education and 
computed the female share of housework. In Figure 6 this share is plotted against the 
gender wage gap in the HETUS countries.  The correlation, excluding the Italian outlier 
(see footnote 4), is strongly positive and therefore consistent with Proposition 2. 
 
Figure 6: Correlation between Gender Wage Gap and Female Housework Share 
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Notes: (X-axis) Female Housework Share is constructed as the relative (%) share of housework 
task that married working females exert relative to married working males (from HETUS). (Y-axis) Raw 
Gender wage gaps for workers with less than tertiary education – 2001.  
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Secondly, we make use of the micro data in STUS to compute the intra-
household division of housework. Specifically, we select households of working 
couples as our unit of analysis and estimate the effect of the gender wage gap within the 
household on the female relative share of housework, i.e., (s/1-s).  To achieve a support 
of the distribution of the dependent variable over the entire real line, we estimate a 
linear regression model between the log of (s/1-s) and the (logged) wage gap within the 
couple (log male hourly wage minus log female hourly wage). Other controls are the 
education levels and full-time job status, number of children and availability of 
domestic service and dummies for regions. Initially, we also included the age of both 
women and spouse, although we finally decided to exclude them as their estimated 
coefficients were highly insignificant. OLS results for the specification without regional 
dummies are presented in the first column of Table 2.17 
The results in Table 2 reveal that the response of the female relative housework 
share with respect to the (logged) wage gap is such that an increase of 10 percentage 
points in the wage gap raises the female share by 0.45 percentage points, and this 
magnitude is statistically significant at 5% significance level.18 Other interesting results 
are the expected ones: female’s (male’s) higher educational attainment and working 
full-time (part-time) lead to a reduction (increase) in the female share of housework, 
whereas a larger number of children or the lack of domestic service increases it.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 OLS is used because, at the individual level, wages are taken as given. However, it could be argued 
that the wage gap might be endogenous for the female housework share if unobserved individual 
characteristics are positively correlated with the wage gap, thus creating spurious correlation between this 
variable and the error term.  We have tried to instrument the wage gap with second or third-order 
polynomials in the age gap and interactions between female education and the age gap, as in Mroz (1987), 
Fortin and Lacroix (1997) and Chiappori et al. (2002). However, somewhat surprisingly, the correlation 
between these variables and the logged wage gap is very weak, which prevents them from being used as 
suitable instruments. Unfortunately, STUS does not contain any other variables that can be used as 
adequate instruments for the gender wage gap.    
18  The estimated coefficient (0.196) corresponds to ω∂−∂ /)1/log( ss . Thus, ωlog/ ∂∂s  
196.0)1(196.0)]1/log(/[ sssss −=−∂∂= . Using the average value of s  in Table 1 (0.65) yields a 
response of 0.045 with a standard error of 0.021 using the delta method.  
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Table 2. Estimates of the Impact of the Gender Wage Gap on 
 Relative Female Housework Share. Dependent Variable: log(s/(1-s)) 
 
Variables Spain 
 [1] [2] 
Logged Wage Gap  0.196** 
(0.091) 
0.188** 
(0.090) 
Dummy of Rich Region --- -0.086* 
(0.050) 
Secondary Educ. (woman) 0.032 
(0.061) 
0.028 
(0.062) 
Secondary Educ. (spouse) -0.084 
(0.072) 
-0.103 
(0.072) 
University Educ (woman) -0.102 
(0.081) 
-0.132* 
(0.082) 
University Educ. (spouse) 0.107 
(0.084) 
0.142* 
(0.074) 
Full-Time job (woman) -0.413*** 
(0.073) 
-0.406*** 
(0.074) 
Full-Time job (spouse) 0.534*** 
(0.134) 
0.540*** 
(0.132) 
Number of children 0.140*** 
(0.032) 
0.143*** 
(0.031) 
Domestic Service -0.123** 
(0.061) 
-0.114* 
(0.061) 
R-squared 0.063 0.065 
N. observations 1578 1578 
 
Note: Robust standard errors.  *, **, *** mean significantly different from zero at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. In column [1], 17 controls for CCAA are also included. In column [2], instead of 17 regional controls, 
we have introduced a dummy for “Rich Regions”. These are those with GDP per capita above the Spanish average: 
Balearic Islands, Cataluña, Madrid, Navarra and the Basque Country.  
 
 
6.3. Female Share of Household work and Productivity 
Given the evidence shown above, we can describe Spain as exhibiting, if anything, a G- 
equilibrium. Proposition 3 above suggests that the G-equilibrium in economies with 
high productivity levels will exhibit a lower female housework share than in economies 
where productivity levels are smaller, a prediction that can be tested with our data.  
As before, we present two types of evidence. First, simple aggregate correlations 
for those countries participating in HETUS are offered. Next, more elaborate intra-
household evidence from STUS is presented. Regarding the former, Figure 7 displays 
GDP per capita and the female share of household work across countries. The 
correlation is strongly negative, and therefore consistent with this implication of the our 
model.  
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Figure 7: Correlation between GDP per Capita and Female Share 
of Housework in HETUS countries 
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   Notes: (X-axis)  Female Housework Share, constructed as the relative (%) share of housework  task that married 
working females exert relative to married working males (from HETUS). (Y-axis) Real GDP per capita in 2002 US 
dollars.  
 
In order to measure the partial correlation between productivity and the within 
household female share, we can make use of the fact that we have information on the 
Spanish regions (Comunidades Autónomas or CC.AA) in which the household lives. 
Given that there are significant differences in productivity levels among regions, we can 
examine to what extent more productive regions exhibit a lower female share of 
housework, as Proposition 3 asserts. Regional productivity levels are measured in terms 
of regional GDP per capita (in 2002) and we compute the average female housework 
share by region from our sample of couples. Five regions have a GDP per capita clearly 
above the national average: the Balearic Islands, Cataluña, Madrid, Navarra and the 
Basque Country. We denote these as “rich regions”. At the aggregate level, Figure 8 
depicts the correlation between regional labour productivity and the female share, which 
turns out to be negative as well. At the micro level, a dummy variable for rich regions is 
constructed and, again using OLS, we look at the impact of working a rich region on the 
female share of housework task. We also intersected this dummy variable with the 
logged wage gap but the coefficient turned out to be insignificant. Column 2 of Table 2 
displays the results of this exercise. The impact of working in a rich region is negative 
and significant at the 10% level, which point out to the existence of a smaller female 
share in housework tasks in more productive regions, as Proposition 3 suggests.   
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Figure 8: Correlation between Regional GDP p.c. and  
Regional Average Female Housework Share 
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Notes: (X-axis)  Real GDP per capita in 2002 euros of Spanish CCAA. (Y-axis).Female  Housework Share (Regional 
averages), constructed as the ration of the share of housework performed by married working females to that of 
married working males (from STUS).  
 
6.4. Female share of housework and policies 
The empirical predictions of the proposed model regarding the effects of a subsidy are 
not clear-cut: in asymmetric households where men have more bargaining power than 
women, a subsidy targeted at working women can shift the G- equilibrium to the U one. 
However, in a symmetric household, the U-equilibrium can only be achieved through a 
neutral-gender subsidy targeted at both members of the household. Testing accurately 
this empirical prediction is not feasible with the data at hand since the STUS lacks 
information on whether the male, female or both members of the household receive a 
family-aid subsidy. In these circumstances, all we can offer is some descriptive 
evidence on the correlation between the percentage of GDP spent on family aid 
expenditure and the female share of housework task across countries using the 
aggregate data from HETUS. Figure 9 displays such correlation. The relationship 
between the two variables is strongly negative: countries which devote a greater share 
of the GDP to family aid are those where the female share of housework is lower, and 
vice versa. This preliminary evidence may be interpreted in terms of our discussion in 
section 5.3 about asymmetric economies where a different bargaining power may exist. 
However, more research needs to be done in order to clarify the channels through which 
these subsidies affect household decisions. 
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Figure 9: Correlation between Expenditure on Family Aid and 
 Female Share of Housework  
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Notes: (X-axis)  Female Housework Share, constructed as the relative (%) share of housework  task that married 
working females exert relative to married working males (from HETUS). (Y-axis) Family Aid Expenditures as a 
percentage of GDP (2001).  
 
 
7. Conclusions 
We have proposed a simple model of self-fulfilling prophecies in which statistical 
discrimination of women results in housework and labour market differences across 
genders despite men and women being ex-ante identical. In contrast with other models 
in this literature, our model does not rely either on moral hazard due to unobservable 
effort, efficiency wages in some sectors or adverse selection problems. Instead, we 
propose a framework in which employers train equally productive men and women, but 
have different expectations about the distribution of disutility shocks (unexpected need 
of household work) that each gender will face after they have been trained for a job. If 
future wages are predetermined with regard to these shocks, then job quit rates will 
differ across genders, causing labour market participation to depend on expected wages 
and vice versa.  
Our model gives rise to two types of equilibrium -gendered and ungendered- 
leading to several policy implications which are harder to obtain in other models. First, 
in contrast to most of the literature, welfare in the symmetric equilibrium can be greater 
than in the asymmetric one. The reason for this result is that having one member of the 
household specializing in home production has two opposing effects: on the one hand, it 
leads to greater expected household income, as is standard in the existing literature; on 
the other, the disutility of housework is minimized when this task is evenly shared  
 34
amongst household members. Which effect dominates depends crucially on the level of 
productivity: the ungendered equilibrium results in higher welfare in highly productive 
economies, while the opposite holds in less productive ones. The immediate implication 
of this result is that the desirability of policy intervention may not be the same in all 
economies. In particular, we have shown that a policy of family aid (e.g., wage 
subsidies) targeted to married women may not only fail to achieve a symmetric 
equilibrium but could also worsen the gender wage gap. In contrast, a gender-neutral 
subsidy (i.e., targeted to both members of the couple) could be more efficient at leading 
to an ungendered equilibrium, and such policy works better in more productive 
economies.  
Preliminary evidence using European (macro data) and Spanish (micro data) 
time-use surveys yields support to some of our empirical predictions concerning the 
relationship between wages and the sharing of household tasks, as well as the role of 
productivity. However, more empirical work is needed in order to test other ones, 
notably the effect of alternative tax-subsidy policies whose effects we cannot identify 
with the datasets at hand. This remains in our future research agenda. 
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Data Appendix 
Table  A1 – List of Activities coded in the European Time Survey – 2002-2003 
Group of Activities Activities included 
0. Personal Care Sleep, eat, other personal care 
1. Job Main and second job, activities related to 
employment 
2. Study School and University, homework 
3. Family and housework Food preparation, dish washing, cleaning 
dwelling, other household upkeep, 
laundry, ironing, handicraft, gardening, 
tending domestic animals, caring for pets, 
walking the dog, construction and repairs, 
shopping and services, physical care, 
supervision of child, teaching, reading and 
talking with child, other domestic work 
4. Voluntary work and meetings Organisational work, informal help to 
other households, participatory activities 
5. Social life and leisure Visits and feasts, other social life, 
entertainment and culture, resting 
6. Sports and outdoor activities Walking and hiking, other sports or 
outdoor activities 
7. Hobbies and computer games Computer and video games, other 
computing, other hobbies and games 
8. Lecture, radio and TV Reading books, other reading, TV and 
video, radio and music, unspecified 
leisure 
9. Travel related to work or others Travel to/from work, study or shopping, 
other travel 
 
   
